For more than fifty years, Lebanese politicians have been accustomed to not agreeing on any national matter except through the dominance of one party, which the other parties then submit to its choice. This happened with the Palestinians, who established a front in southern Lebanon, provoking two Israeli invasions (1978, 1982). Just as the Palestinians found internal supporters to rely on, the Syrians, who entered Lebanon to control the Palestinians and quell internal conflict, also found internal supporters and remained for thirty years. When their dominance ended or nearly ended in 2005, they were succeeded by a dominant faction, Hezbollah, backed by Iran, but it also had strong internal supporters, a reality that continued until 2024.

During these 'dominances,' if the expression is correct, the official Lebanese authority remained but was helpless, while the army and security forces coordinated with the dominant party so that 'the wolf does not die nor the sheep perish,' as the saying goes. To tame the political authority and its symbol, the president of the republic, four consecutive army commanders became presidents. The constitution states that the president is the supreme commander of the armed forces.

Among the dominant factions, the Syrians were the only ones who did not clash fiercely with Israel, except for a brief clash in 1982 initiated by the Israelis. Therefore, the secret to the Syrians' endurance in Lebanon was that they stayed out of southern Lebanon, with their maximum limit being the city of Sidon. As for the Palestinians and Hezbollah, they stationed in the south and fought Israel from there; indeed, to this day, they justify their existence—I mean Hezbollah—by resisting Israel in and from the south. But in any case, as you justify your armed presence in the south, you must have control over parts of the Lebanese interior, and most importantly, control over the political and military leadership. Hence, in the Syrian era and the current partisan era, both factions had weight in the Council of Ministers and the Parliament, and an unchallenged say in all elections, including the election or selection of presidents.

Since the late 1980s, and despite the absence of Syrian forces in the south, any crisis with Israel resulted in tripartite negotiations or communications: Syria + the armed party, or President Nabih Berri + the Lebanese state. When the Syrians left in 2005, negotiations became bilateral, i.e., the Shia parties, followed by the official authorities. The authorities sign, but those who negotiate indirectly and decide are President Berri and the party. Even in the negotiations on the maritime border with Israel, the American mediator had to speak with the Israeli authorities and, on the Lebanese side, with President Berri, who holds a mandate from the party that remains unbroken to this day.

Since the election of Joseph Aoun as president and Nawaf Salam as prime minister, a decisive change has occurred in the official Lebanese interior, at least. The dominant parties lost their majority in Parliament and in the government. It is true that the army commander became president as usual, but other political factions, mostly Christians and Sunnis, led the presidential election, while Shia deputies were the last among the factions in this choice.

The change was striking. However, its effects on matters of dominance would not have appeared so quickly as long as the party's weapons were in its hands, were it not for three main events: the fall of the Assad regime and the exit of Iranians from Syria; second, Hezbollah's rush to engage with Israel in two support wars (the first to aid Hamas, the second to avenge Khamenei), which weakened it greatly, killed its leaders, and cut off its supply lines; and third, Israel's occupation of vast areas in southern Lebanon, forcing the party to withdraw in front of it, though it continues resistance, but it is pressured by the masses of displaced people leaving the south under the weight of fierce Israeli attacks.

For over a year, relations between President Aoun and President Berri remained excellent. It seemed that the priority was to strengthen against Nawaf Salam and his government, which took several decisions (of course, with President Aoun present) against the party and its weapons. However, the fierce Israeli war on Lebanese soil imposed new realities and policies. Pushed by the administration of US President Donald Trump, President Aoun called for direct negotiations with Israel in Washington, for the first time without Shia participation. President Berri said they are not consulted, as they oppose direct negotiations, and they rely on Iran in its negotiations with the United States to stop the war and withdraw the Israelis from the south(!). Of course, this is an illusion because Trump, who seemed to accept an Iranian role, soon under Israeli pressure moved toward an agreement with the Lebanese authority and Israel in the fifth round of talks on a gradual, complex withdrawal with political aspects.

Since the May 17, 1983 agreement between Lebanon and Israel, which was thwarted by Syria, and then armed Shia took over all other field agreements, this is a new type of agreement undertaken by the Lebanese authority alone, with strong American contribution, and supported by Arabs and internationals. Will the new agreement succeed despite fierce Shia opposition from within and from Iran? The cost is huge in both cases: if the agreement succeeds, who will disarm the party as required by Israel, and who will rebuild? If it fails due to intransigence from Israel and the party, each in their own way, the system will weaken, chaos will prevail, and the elderly will remember the era of President Amine Gemayel!