SummaryIn an analytical reading of the renewed escalation between Washington and Tehran, Saudi political analyst Suleiman Al-Aqeeli says that Washington's retreat from escalation at the time was clear, and does not necessarily mean the loss of the last leverage, but it indicates "a transition from direct military deterrence to containment through sanctions, financial controls, and executive conditions," explaining that "this pattern is less shocking than military force, but more sustainable if accompanied by strict monitoring of fund flows and their use," as developments have shown.

Perhaps the biggest strategic mistake Tehran made in the ongoing war was misinterpreting America's motives behind signing the controversial memorandum of understanding with it. For years, Western research centers have spoken of "the erosion of U.S. deterrence" due to the turmoil in managing regional conflicts and declining trust among some allies. However, this discussion, which revolved around the effectiveness of political deterrence, turned in Iran's reading into a conviction that the United States had lost its will, and perhaps its ability, to use military force due to internal pressures and electoral obligations. Hence, Iran treated the latest memorandum of understanding as a confirmation of a new equation in the Gulf, and preoccupied itself with marketing what it considered a diplomatic victory in the Strait of Hormuz, while Washington viewed the agreement from a completely different angle—as a means to manage escalation, not to acknowledge new strategic realities.

Managing Escalation and PowerThis comes as observers note a big difference between the shaking of the deterrence image and the decline of the power tools themselves. As soon as Washington decided to move from managing the crisis to imposing costs, Iran found itself once again facing the U.S. arsenal, turning the memorandum of understanding it had touted as a political victory into a symbol of strategic misunderstanding with a power it thought its deterrence had eroded.

The Johns Hopkins Institute had warned that "escalation management is an integral part of deterrence," cautioning in a detailed analysis of the "U.S. deterrence" methodology that misunderstanding the opponent's behavior could lead to wrong decisions, because "the opponent's perceptions, not objective measures, are the dominant variable in determining the success or failure of deterrence." What happened later seemed like a practical embodiment of this gap in perception between the two sides.

True, Israeli and Western studies have observed a decrease in the cost of targeting U.S. and Gulf interests compared to what it used to be, and the Johns Hopkins Institute called on Washington to "stop reacting to the dilemmas posed by opponents, and instead focus on imposing escalation dilemmas on them." However, none of these studies concluded that the United States had lost its ability to impose a deterrent cost when it decided to do so.

This U.S. shift did not come from a vacuum; it was preceded by a recent history of severe and deep tensions with traditional allies in Europe and NATO. Before the outbreak of the latest confrontation, Washington's foreign policy was characterized by excessive unilateralism, as it exerted intense pressure on European capitals and accused them of free-riding on the U.S. security umbrella.

In this context, the Council on Foreign Relations in a detailed analysis noted that "unilateralism and disdain for allies led to an unprecedented erosion of the trust wall between the two sides of the Atlantic, pushing European powers to seriously seek strategic and defensive independence away from the U.S. umbrella."

Two U.S. fighter jets take off from the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (Reuters)

This deep rift was exploited by adversaries of Washington to enhance their influence, benefiting from the absence of unified Western coordination. With the spark of the latest war in the region, this U.S. unilateralism collided with a wall of complex realities on the ground, especially after the reckless Israeli rush toward comprehensive escalation, raising the ceiling of military expectations to levels Washington could not match without sliding into an open regional war that could destroy the global economy. According to estimates by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "Washington found itself in a real dilemma, as the Israeli rush demonstrated the limits of unilateral U.S. power, and forced the administration to rein in escalation and accept the terms of diplomatic calm by signing a temporary memorandum of understanding with Tehran, reflecting a clear retreat from the concept of brute deterrence."

But this humility is not meaningless in the estimation of a seasoned political analyst like Thomas Friedman, who knows the Middle East crises and U.S. handling of them. While acknowledging that the chaos Trump left in the region, even Kissinger would find it hard to repair, let alone what he called a group of activists and amateur real estate developers, he nonetheless stressed that the White House has more in store to create trouble for Iran, were it not constrained by the midterm elections—to the extent that he accused Trump of "betraying Israel and the Gulf states for the sake of the swing states Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Georgia" when he lifted the blockade against Iran in the strait, suggesting that Trump realized that if gas and food prices continued to rise as they had since the start of the war, he would very likely lose those states.

U.S. Retreat and Redefinition of DeterrenceIn an analytical reading of the renewed escalation between Washington and Tehran, Saudi political analyst Suleiman Al-Aqeeli says that Washington's retreat from escalation at the time was clear, and does not necessarily mean the loss of the last leverage, but it indicates "a transition from direct military deterrence to containment through sanctions, financial controls, and executive conditions," explaining that "this pattern is less shocking than military force, but more sustainable if accompanied by strict monitoring of fund flows and their use," as developments have shown.

Al-Aqeeli added in his reading of the regional and international scene that "the recent U.S. steps to retreat from brute deterrence stem originally from domestic policy motives and falling under their pressures, and it is a natural result of the limits of 'America First' policies when they collide with complex external challenges." This view aligns with what the Washington Institute for Near East Policy proposed, which published an assessment affirming that "the U.S. administration has come to realize the limits of its ability to wage new military wars of attrition in a multipolar international environment, prompting it to replace military battleships with the language of strict financial pressure and banking guillotines as an alternative deterrent tool." It opined that this retreat may push Washington to gradually abandon the role of the sole policeman in the region and attempt to involve international and regional powers in bearing the cost of security stability, imposing a new reality oscillating between fragile calm and a reordering of influence.

The Gulf Develops Self-Determined Solutions