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Summary

The war with Iran did not achieve a complete victory, but it weakened Tehran militarily and regionally, reduced the influence of its proxies, and placed Washington in a better negotiating position on the nuclear file. The U.S. mission now is not to overthrow the Iranian regime, but to consolidate gains, keep the Strait of Hormuz open, and impose long-term restrictions on uranium enrichment.

The ceasefire agreement with Iran was widely dismissed in Washington. After more than three months of war, the United States and Israel failed to achieve many of their objectives, including overthrowing the regime in Tehran and ending Iran's potential nuclear threat.

But the outcome looks different when viewed from a broader perspective. The regional conflict, which lasted nearly three years, began with Hamas's attack on Israel in October 2023 and culminated in Operation Epic Fury this spring, placed the United States and its partners in a much stronger position in the Middle East, leaving Iran in a state of severe weakness. Tehran's network of armed groups has been largely destroyed, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, one of Iran's key partners, has fled, and Beijing and Moscow, despite being nominal allies, have largely ignored Tehran. Iran's conventional forces and much of its defense and nuclear industrial base have been destroyed. Iran's only victory in the latest round of conflict was its ability to close the Strait of Hormuz and cause economic damage worldwide. However, closing the strait also harms Iran itself, and its impact is likely to diminish over time as countries seek alternative suppliers, oil alternatives, and new shipping routes to avoid transiting the strait.

This does not mean the war was executed perfectly or went according to plan. But the cumulative effect of three years of efforts to weaken a dangerous and threatening Iranian regime has left the United States in a strong position to consolidate its gains. The memorandum of understanding ending the war opens the door for direct U.S.-Iranian talks, which could increase regional stability. The restrictions the memorandum imposes on Iran's nuclear program remain vague so far, but the United States' ability to use economic sanctions and the credible threat of further bombing gives it leverage it can use to impose permanent restrictions on Iranian uranium enrichment. Rather than being a foreign policy failure, the war may be the final chapter in a successful effort to contain Tehran's regional threats and achieve a long-term ceasefire.

The Big Picture

The military campaign launched by the United States and Israel on February 28 cannot be viewed in isolation from its broader context. In the legal justification for the operation, issued by the U.S. State Department on April 21, the department stated that 'Operation Raging Fury is merely the latest round of an ongoing international armed conflict with Iran.' That conflict began with Hamas's attack on Israel in 2023 and continued across the region during both the Biden and Trump administrations. It included Israeli ground operations in Gaza and Lebanon, the fall of Assad, U.S. and European naval forces engaging in air and naval battles with the Houthis in and around the Red Sea, as well as Iranian air and missile strikes targeting Israel, the United States, and Arab partners in the Gulf.

When the latest round of fighting with Iran is seen as a campaign within an ongoing conflict, it appears almost inevitable. After the United States and Israel struck the Fordow facility and other nuclear sites during the 12-Day War in June 2025, the Trump administration stopped additional Israeli airstrikes, signaling that Washington was seeking a comprehensive settlement with Tehran to end the cycle of violence and limit its nuclear program. Then the administration held another round of nuclear talks with Iran in February, aiming to push Tehran to limit enrichment and explore whether that would also push it to ease its aggressive approach in the region. Although Iran made some concessions—leaked reports said it agreed to temporarily halt enrichment—U.S. negotiators concluded that Tehran was not ready to abandon its broader nuclear ambitions or its pursuit of regional hegemony.

The war destroyed a large part of Iran's remaining military capabilities

Iran's actions after the 12-Day War reinforced the impression that it was determined to maintain its regional dominance. Tehran quickly deployed new long-range ballistic missiles, which Israel saw as providing a shield for Iran's nuclear program. In January, the Iranian regime violently suppressed a nationwide popular uprising. The Islamic regime showed that it would not change, meaning the United States and Israel were dealing with the same adversary that had ignited war in 2023 through its proxies and would inevitably continue to fuel more conflicts.

The only question for Washington was whether it was more effective to strike sooner or later. The Trump administration and Israel concluded that attacking Iran while it was still relatively weakened after the 12-Day War and the popular uprising was better than waiting for it to regain its footing and rebuild its missile stockpile. The problem with the February 28 attack decision was not the timing, but the ambitious notion that the Trump administration could achieve a complete victory similar to what it did in Venezuela, and its lack of preparation for predictable countermoves. The administration neglected decades of U.S. military planning for the possibility of a Strait of Hormuz closure and ignored lessons from past experiences on the difficulty of overthrowing ideological adversaries such as Hezbollah, the Islamic State, and the Taliban.

Tangible Progress

But even with legitimate reservations about the war's objectives and the level of preparation, the United States and Israel have inflicted significant damage on Iran since February 28. Tehran's proxy network, weakened over the past three years, has now completely collapsed. The remnants of Hamas have maintained the ceasefire in Gaza, and unlike in 2023 and 2024, when Iraqi militias and the Houthis in Yemen launched hundreds of attacks on U.S. military assets and commercial ships in the Red Sea, Iran's proxy networks have largely remained on the sidelines in the latest round of conflict. Baghdad rejected candidates closest to Iran for the prime minister position after the November 2025 elections, and the Iraqi militias loyal to Iran have taken some steps, albeit at least symbolic, to integrate into the official Iraqi government. Israel also decisively defeated the only proxy that entered the conflict, Hezbollah, and for the first time in more than 40 years, Lebanon entered direct negotiations with Israel over the disarmament of Hezbollah. Israel now controls territory in Lebanon reaching the Litani River, 15 to 20 miles north of the Israeli border, and the memorandum of understanding does not require it to relinquish these gains.