Summary: Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, and even before it, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has leveled sharp criticism at Israel and its government, accusing it of committing 'massacres' in the Strip. Israel rejected these accusations, responding that Ankara had not seriously condemned the October 7 attack by Hamas. Political disputes between Turkey and Israel continued for three years, but they escalated markedly after the regime change in Syria.

Until now, only a few researchers and observers have discussed the possibility of a war between Turkey and Israel, although the leaders of both countries have gone far in exchanging accusations about the likelihood of such a conflict, prompting observers and analysts to study this possibility and anticipate its early repercussions if it actually erupts.

However, there is a fundamental difference between threatening war and the outbreak of an actual military confrontation, and both countries are well aware of this difference. But the continuous escalation of tensions between these two middle powers carries dangers that make it a direct threat to regional security and stability, which requires serious analysis, not only to inform public opinion of its dimensions, but also to urge international powers, foremost among them Western countries, to act to prevent it before it is too late.

Voices are rising in both countries warning of an impending military confrontation on multiple fronts, at a time when the region is witnessing rapid transformations in its regional axes, including changes in the position of the US administration. However, the deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations did not begin today, but goes back many years; indeed, the roots of the current dispute extend back decades.

Benjamin Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister of Israel in 1996 at the head of a government led by the Likud party, carrying a program based on two parallel goals: confronting the rise of Hamas, and at the same time working to expand the circle of peace agreements with Arab countries.

Then came the September 11 attacks, which launched the United States' broad global campaign against terrorism, redrawing the features of the international order.

Just one year later, the Islamic AKP party led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan won the Turkish elections, remaining in power for subsequent decades.

Since then, both Israel, as the Jewish state, and Turkey, which came to be governed by a party with Islamic reference within a secular state, began to draw long-term strategies that appeared independent on the surface, but in essence carried factors of ideological and strategic collision and a struggle for regional leadership.

However, both sides were initially forced to focus on their immediate challenges.

Turkey, a member of NATO, gradually began to shift from the strict secular Kemalist approach to policies of an Islamic character, not only internally but also in its foreign policy. At the same time, its economy continued to provide important advantages to both the United States and Israel.

As for Israel, it continued over the years to strengthen its strategic partnership with Washington, both militarily and politically, while Turkey in turn built a special relationship with the United States, but along a different path.

Over time, Ankara began its regional expansion project, establishing a military presence in western Libya, strengthening its influence in the Horn of Africa, and then supporting armed Islamist factions in northern Syria.

In contrast, after the October 7 attack, Israel moved toward the Gaza Strip, maintaining control over the eastern part of the Strip, and also carried out several military operations inside southern Lebanon to confront Hezbollah.

But the arena that placed Turkey and Israel on a path of direct confrontation was Syria. Ankara spent years preparing for a regime change operation in Damascus, and it seems that this occurred, to some extent, under tacit Western acceptance or tolerance.

Turkish and Israeli presidents during a previous meeting (AFP)

Through Idlib province, the Turkish government supported and brought together two main Islamist factions: the first was Jabhat al-Nusra, and the second consisted of factions deployed along the northern border with Syria, which were directly under the supervision of Turkish security agencies.

In December 2025, these two forces moved toward the city of Aleppo, before continuing their advance toward Damascus, where the regime of Bashar al-Assad was overthrown, taking advantage of a political window that emerged in Washington during the transition period between the departure of Joe Biden's administration and the arrival of Donald Trump's administration.

With the inauguration of President Ahmad al-Shara as President of Syria, Turkey overnight became one of the most prominent regional powers. Thanks to its NATO membership and possession of American weapons systems, the regional influence of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan doubled after the fall of the Assad regime.

Ankara's military allies now stand on the outskirts of the Golan Heights, on the Jordanian border, and facing southern Lebanon.

This rapid expansion southward gave Turkey greater ability to influence energy equations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Through its allies in Damascus, it now has access to the Syrian coast and to a maritime economic zone containing gas reserves estimated at hundreds of billions of dollars.

But more importantly, the Turkish expansion, led by the AKP, redrew military geopolitical equations not seen in the Arab Mashreq since 1914, with the outbreak of World War I.

The Syrian Arab Army practically operates under the umbrella of Turkish military intelligence, while al-Shara's rule, his forces, and allied factions receive strategic direction from Ankara.

In practical terms, Turkey now directly controls northern Syria and its coast, and has expanded its military presence within what can be described as the new 'Islamic Republic', from the Iraqi border to Lebanon, through advanced weapons systems, including air defense systems deployed in various parts of the country.

Among all the transformations witnessed on the Syrian scene, there are three developments that particularly concern Israel.

First, the Turkish advance toward the Iraqi and Jordanian borders, which could, in the long term, form a base for Ankara's influence to extend toward the Arabian Peninsula.

Second, the possibility of Turkish influence spreading to northern Lebanon, especially to the predominantly Sunni city of Tripoli, north of Mount Lebanon.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan shaking hands with Syrian President Ahmad al-Shara during their meeting in Ankara (AP)​​​​​​​

Thus, it seems that the entire Fertile Crescent region is gradually falling under a post-Ottoman sphere of influence, in direct contact with Israeli airspace. Therefore, the Israeli Ministry of Defense has since last year moved to draw a red line south of Damascus, aimed at preventing the new Syrian leadership from approaching the Golan Heights or positioning near it.

After the attacks targeting members of the Druze community in July 2026, attributed to extremist militias, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued orders to bomb the Ministry of Defense building and the presidential palace in central Damascus, in a clear message warning against any advance southward toward Israeli lines.