With every failure of the Saudi national team, the same scene repeats: searching for a new culprit, sometimes the coach, sometimes the administrators, and other times the players, while the root of the problem is ignored: the flaw is not in individuals, but in the system.

Crises are not solved by reactions or by changing names, but by launching a long-term national project based on institutional planning, investment in youth categories, and manufacturing the Saudi player according to integrated scientific programs technically, physically, and mentally, with a vision spanning years, not just a season or a tournament.

The experience of the Moroccan national team is the best proof; what it achieved was not a coincidence, but the fruit of a project that began years ago, relying on stability, infrastructure development, and attention to youth categories, until the results became a natural reflection of sustainable institutional work.

In contrast, some reduce the reasons for decline to the increase in the number of foreign players, while reality proves that the problem is deeper; if the foreign player were the cause, the price of the local player would not have risen, and clubs would not have continued rotating the same names amid a scarcity of talents capable of imposing themselves.

Also, the stumbling of some players in external professional experiences, or the success of others after moving between clubs, confirms that the issue is not in the player's location, but in the quality of preparation and qualification. This is exacerbated by media and fan bias that imposes psychological pressure on national team players, in the absence of sufficient deterrence.

The truth is that reducing the number of foreign players, without real development of the Saudi player, may negatively reflect on the technical level of the league. The problem is not in the presence of the foreign player, but in the weak outputs of the local player manufacturing.

Moreover, modern football no longer relies on talent alone, but on physical strength, speed, tactical discipline, and mental readiness. Here, one of the most prominent weaknesses appears; the performance of many Saudi players declines in the final minutes, which is an indicator of shortcomings in preparation, not in talent.

Saudi football does not need a new culprit after every failure, but a clear national project that produces talents, builds competencies, and establishes a system that works with a mindset of planning and sustainability. Great national teams are not built by emotional decisions, but by years of accumulated work.

It is time to move from a culture of searching for the guilty to a culture of building solutions, and from crisis management to creating the future.

Great national teams are not the product of an exceptional generation, but the fruit of an exceptional national project.

Saleh Al-Qablan