The current events in the region bring us back to the policy of former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger towards Arab countries, rooted in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For decades, a belief has been marketed that his policy, based on the so-called 'disassembly and reassembly' theory—disassembling the unity of Arab fronts and preventing a comprehensive Arab war against Israel—aimed to tame Arab peoples and states, turning them into minimally stable but powerless countries. This may be true from an American perspective, and perhaps also from a traditional Arab viewpoint grounded in a political angle that has underpinned Arab policy for decades.

In this article, I open a window for discussion on one aspect of the transformation that has occurred in Arab policy and compare it to Kissinger's project—a discussion that naturally requires more than one article to unpack all its facets and connections. The past few years have imposed many challenges on both the Arab citizen and observer, placing them before two options with no third: either to continue reading history from a narrow perspective dominated by emotion and populism (and the author of these lines fell into that trap at a certain stage) or by political agendas mobilized for specific purposes, or from a new perspective that reads the transformations well, and most importantly understands the Arab political transformations themselves, and re-reads events from outside the narrow traditional Arab box.

The godfather of foreign policy, Henry Kissinger, wanted to disengage Arab countries from each other through the gateway of the conflict with Israel—that is, to remove the Arab-Israeli conflict from the logic of a unified front while solidifying Israeli superiority in the region. Egypt's Camp David was the first model of this disassembly, followed by Jordan, and eventually the transformations witnessed by most Arab states up to the present day.

However, Kissinger may not have anticipated that this transformation, whose first letters were inscribed through the gateway of war against Israel, would lead to the rise of an Arab political, economic, and developmental power that today is a fundamental pillar not only of regional security, economic, and political stability, but also of global system stability. The Gulf Arab states are the face and depth of this transformation, despite the different political agendas of each country. This transformation effectively began with the 2030 vision launched by the Kingdom in 2016, which became the model followed by most other states. These countries did not try to reproduce old power but rather invented a new concept of power based on the state, development, and influence. They have largely succeeded—and continue to do so—in leveraging their financial strength to impose themselves as a geo-economic force that enables them to protect their national security without entering into protracted and exhausting wars. In this context, it is worth noting the ability demonstrated by Gulf states to protect themselves at the lowest possible cost to contain the repercussions of Israeli recklessness in the region and recent Iranian attacks on their territories. This transformation was not rapid but came as a result of economic and political accumulations spanning decades at all levels—economy, energy, diplomacy, soft power, technology, and others—in addition to the development of their military systems, crystallizing into national projects.

A number of Arab countries—especially Gulf states—have shed the cloak of slogans and attrition in long conflicts that only led to more suffering, destruction, divisions, political instability, and the spread of corruption. In countries like Lebanon, corruption and arms are two sides of the same coin. States that prioritize their own national interest above any other issue, coupled with a vision for development and institution-building at the national level, have proven more effective in acquiring tools of political pressure even on issues beyond national borders, such as the Palestinian cause. For example, Saudi Arabia is pushing to build a new balance linking any potential relationship with Israel to a political ceiling for Palestinians—namely, a Palestinian state in line with the 2002 Beirut Peace Conference.

Hence, the most important lesson for countries like Lebanon and Palestine from these regional transformations is the realization that the tools of confrontation have changed, and that slogans and cross-border arms based on the standards of the 1970s do not protect a country but rather turn it into a bargaining chip in others' negotiations. What protects them and preserves their existence, identity, and role is possessing a national decision based on the constitution and moving away from ideological projects, and relying on building actual—not nominal—state institutions and a productive economy far from networks of influence and corruption.

The most distinctive feature of this path is that these states are in a constant and necessary state of interaction and development—depending on events, such as the current war in the region—of their military defensive capabilities and economic tools, based on a clear political vision.

Returning to Kissinger, it can be said that his strategy—which aimed to reshape the region without a power that worries Israel or even the United States itself—now faces the rise of an Arab power shaped by Gulf states. This power possesses the tools of influence that today are drawn as much by economics, technology, institutions, and development as by military arsenals to confront regional challenges. The Gulf states have rightly read the coming transformations on a global scale, thus acquired their tools, and succeeded in leveraging their capabilities and transforming them into a vision and state project that has made them a regional and international force whose political weight and influence cannot be ignored by allies, rivals, or enemies alike. So, has Kissinger's strategy towards the Arabs backfired on him? The discussion continues.