The decision of Sadrist leader Muqtada al-Sadr to move from silence to open support for the anti-corruption campaign led by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi appears to mark a turning point in Iraqi political balances, opening the door to direct confrontation with the forces of the 'Coordination Framework,' after years of competition through political and electoral tools rather than open confrontation.

The first notable reaction came from the leader of the 'State of Law' coalition and former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who defended the 'Coordination Framework' as a political project that has proven its success, in a move widely interpreted as an attempt to contain the growing pressures facing the ruling Shiite alliance.

These developments come at a time when signs of divergence have begun to appear within the 'Coordination Framework,' which was formed after the 2021 elections as an alternative to the traditional Shiite alliances that have succeeded each other since the 2005 elections, starting with the 'United Iraqi Alliance,' which was said to have had the support of the religious establishment at the time, through the 'National Alliance,' to the current formula that emerged after the Sadrist movement left the governing equation.

Archival photo of Sadrist leader Muqtada al-Sadr (Reuters)

Sadr's silence

After the 2021 elections, al-Sadr had attempted to form a 'national majority' government comprising the 'Kurdistan Democratic Party' led by Masoud Barzani and a Sunni alliance led by former Speaker of Parliament Mohammed al-Halbousi, but the project stalled due to what was known as the 'blocking third,' which prevented the election of the president by the constitutionally required majority, leading to continued political deadlock.

In the summer of 2022, al-Sadr decided to withdraw his deputies from parliament, announcing his withdrawal from the political process. Addressing members of his parliamentary bloc at the time, he said: 'I have decided to withdraw from the political process so as not to participate with the corrupt in any way.' He added that he would not participate in any elections in the 'presence of the corrupt,' calling on his supporters to maintain their political and popular organization in preparation for any future stage if circumstances changed.

Since then, al-Sadr has boycotted subsequent elections, including the most recent ones, despite repeated calls for him to return to the political process, including from his opponents within the 'Coordination Framework.'

'Anti-corruption' changes the equation

The most notable development came with the anti-corruption campaign launched by the government of Ali al-Zaidi, which reached its peak with the arrest of 21 political and parliamentary figures in what was known as Operation 'Fajr's Charge.'

The campaign gained further momentum after Judge Diaa Jafar, who is leading the investigation into the case, announced that part of the embezzled funds had been used to finance electoral campaigns, a statement that raised widespread questions about the integrity of the last electoral process and the extent of the influence of political money on its results.

Observers believe that these developments have provided al-Sadr with a political ground that intersects with the positions he announced since his withdrawal from parliament, based on his refusal to participate in a system he considers tainted by corruption.

Prime Minister of Iraq Ali Faleh al-Zaidi (Government Media)

Settlement or restructuring?

The selection of Ali al-Zaidi as prime minister came after the forces of the 'Coordination Framework' failed to agree on a candidate from within their ranks. After ruling out granting former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani a second term and the stalling of Nouri al-Maliki's candidacy amid internal and external objections, political forces turned to choosing a figure from outside the traditional political class.

Al-Zaidi, a businessman in his forties, is seen as an acceptable choice for Washington, in contrast to an Iranian position characterized by caution and a lack of the usual enthusiasm, amid declining Iranian influence in Iraq compared to previous years.

Al-Zaidi's positions have drawn attention since the early days of his tenure, whether by not participating in the funeral ceremonies of the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which were attended by a number of 'Coordination Framework' leaders and the official Iraqi delegation headed by President Nizar Amidi, or by announcing his intention to strengthen relations with the United States, with expectations of a visit to Washington within weeks.

Domestically, al-Zaidi announced his intention to proceed with disarming armed factions, giving those factions a deadline ending in September, a file that successive Iraqi governments have failed to resolve due to its political and security complexities.

Supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr wave the Iraqi flag during a demonstration in support of the Iraqi government's anti-corruption measures in Najaf (AP)

Al-Sadr breaks his silence

The turning point came when al-Sadr announced his full adoption of the anti-corruption campaign, describing al-Zaidi as a 'soldier of reform,' in a step that went beyond political support to granting the government broad popular cover.

This was followed by demonstrations in support of the campaign, as Sadrist leaders began engaging in support after months of adhering to silence awaiting al-Sadr's instructions.

Observers believe that this development represents the first broad political and popular alignment against the forces dominating power since 2003, especially since the anti-corruption campaign has targeted figures affiliated with influential forces within the 'Coordination Framework.'

Adding to the sensitivity of the scene is that the priorities of al-Zaidi's government, foremost among them fighting corruption and monopolizing weapons in the hands of the state, intersect with the priorities of the administration of US President Donald Trump towards Iraq, which, according to analysts, creates an intersection of interests between Washington and the Sadrist movement, despite fundamental differences between them on other files.

Pressure on the 'Coordination Framework'

This intersection does not mean a direct political alliance between al-Sadr and the US administration, but it gives the government support from two sides that were traditionally seen as being on opposite ends of the Iraqi scene, which multiplies the pressure on the 'Coordination Framework.'

In response to these developments, Nouri al-Maliki rushed to defend the 'Coordination Framework,' asserting in a post on platform 'X' that the alliance 'formed an incubator for the national political process,' and that its success was embodied in the formation of three successive governments.

He added that 'there is no reason to abandon a project that has proven its success,' stressing that '(the Framework) will remain a framework as it was founded, preserving its constants, identity, and founders,' considering that any development should be limited to working mechanisms and performance, not affecting the essence of the project.

"); googletag.cmd.push(function() { onDvtagReady(function () { googletag.display('div-gpt-ad-3341368-4'); }); }); }