The Arab Gulf states face security and existential challenges that may be greater than any they have faced before, including the Iraq-Iran war and the invasion of Kuwait. Back then, the world was clearer and more aligned, whereas today betting on alliances, agreements, or war technologies is not enough.

Iran's systematic attacks against the six Gulf states will not end with the war; perhaps they are just the beginning. They are currently driving further armament and enhancement of self-capabilities, alongside the emergence of new axes.

It is likely that the war with Iran will be the last American war in the region. Washington, since achieving oil self-sufficiency, has wanted to withdraw—Obama started it, Biden spoke about it, and now Trump is seeking it.

One of the byproducts of the vacuum is the return of competing regional alliances and axes, such as Islamabad and Ankara. If the goal is to deter Iran and achieve balance in the region, are they capable of that? The Saudi-Pakistani agreement is bilateral, not an axis, and is based on military cooperation. Turkey is not willing to confront Iran; it enjoys the NATO umbrella and a military relationship with the United States and will not let its alliance drag it into a confrontation with Tehran.

Iran, whose intentions under the new leadership cannot yet be judged, if it continues its aggressive policy, will push the Gulf states toward cooperation with Israel. Let us not forget that Iran was the reason for the first arrival of the US Fifth Fleet in the Gulf when it targeted oil tankers. Likewise, its threats are behind the proliferation of foreign bases and military agreements.

In the crisis of the war since last February, there is a complex regional conflict triangle: Iran, the Gulf, and Israel. Due to Iran's ongoing attacks on the Gulf states, they in turn will seek to create a new deterrence system to fill the vacuum, should the United States sign a non-aggression agreement with Tehran.

We can only judge Iran's intentions when it matches words with deeds. Will it end its 'pincer' that threatens the security of the Gulf states from north and south? This would require it to abandon the militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.

In this war, Iran has taken revenge on the Gulf states whenever it fails to confront Israel in Lebanon or fears responding to the United States in Gulf waters. This may push the Gulf states to ally, even with the devil.

Iranian attacks have contributed to rapprochement and reduction of differences among Gulf Cooperation Council members, but have not ended them. With the growing Iranian threat—which will likely increase after the war—they will find themselves compelled to rebuild their front to repel the Iranian danger.

What drives this skeptical and cautious thinking? Do the Gulf states fear that the Iranians and Americans might reach an agreement at their expense? It is unlikely that the negotiations contain anything Washington could concede against them. More likely, Iranian negotiators will seek to reassure the Gulf that Iran does not target them at the end of the war. With the new reality, Iran will seek to compensate for its major regional losses, perhaps by adopting a compensatory policy regarding Lebanon and Syria.

We see this compensatory positioning in Tehran's insistence on extending its control over the Strait of Hormuz to threaten its adversaries, and taking the Gulf states hostage in every crisis with the United States and Israel. It appears as an attempt to strengthen its leverage after losing Syria, Gaza, and also Lebanon. It used these areas as a means to enforce its geopolitical balance. Here, its control over the strait and the dependency of Gulf security will pose a major threat that will force the western Gulf to create a new reality to confront it.

We can expect a 'peace' agreement with the United States likely based on an exchange of pledges. Washington's main demand is for Iran to end its nuclear program; in return, Tehran stipulates a US pledge of non-aggression. The same condition applies to Israel, which will accept nothing less than the elimination of Hezbollah, thereby ending the Iranian ring around it.

It is not unlikely that the negotiators will agree on Iran pledging not to repeat its aggression against the Gulf states, but that will not prevent Iran from continuing as a source of indirect geopolitical threat to the Gulf, retaining the 'strait' and 'proxy' weapons.

There will be no way to compel Tehran to honor its pledges except through counterforce, and this will require the Gulf states to move to a new phase of reconciliation and cooperation. The GCC states collectively have geographic depth, regional military agreements, and financial power totaling more than four trillion dollars.