Ahmed Al-Shehri

The US-Iran war was not the direct cause of the global economic disruption; rather, it was a test that exposed the fragility of the international trade system. What appeared on the surface as an energy crisis revealed at its core a structural imbalance that had accumulated over three decades, as economic efficiency became the dominant criterion of globalization at the expense of flexibility.

Modern globalization was built on a simple premise: produce goods where costs are lowest, transport them by the fastest routes, and minimize inventory. This model succeeded in reducing production costs and containing inflation for decades, but it also produced increasing dependence on a limited number of production centers, maritime routes, and major corporations. As a result, the global economy became more interconnected and, at the same time, more fragile.

When the Arabian Gulf region faced military disturbances, not only did oil prices rise, but shipping, insurance, and transport costs also increased, and risk was repriced in global markets within a few days.

This was not due to a shortage of goods, but to the increased cost of accessing them. This is the fundamental characteristic of structural imbalance: the shock spreads faster than supply chains can adapt.

Figures illustrate the scale of dependency. Between 20 and 21 million barrels per day pass through the Strait of Hormuz, equivalent to 20-25% of global seaborne oil trade. At the same time, strategic industries such as semiconductors, critical minerals, and pharmaceutical components are concentrated in a limited number of countries, while a few companies control key links in global value chains. The higher this concentration, the more sensitive the global economy becomes to any geopolitical or logistical disruption.

Therefore, what happened in 2026 should not be interpreted merely as an energy crisis, but as a test of the resilience of the global trading system. The World Bank lowered its global growth forecast to 2.5%, the weakest since the COVID-19 pandemic. The International Monetary Fund estimated growth at 3.1% in a baseline scenario, warning that continued disruptions could push growth even lower.

The paradox is that the system designed to maximize efficiency is now generating increasing systemic risks. The more production is concentrated in fewer locations and alternatives diminish, local shocks turn into global crises. In many cases, inflation is no longer the result of rising demand, but a reflection of supply bottlenecks fueled by geographic and production concentration more than by traditional economic factors.

Hence, the fundamental challenge for governments and companies is no longer increasing the volume of trade, but redistributing the risks within it. Diversifying supply chains, expanding the production base, reducing reliance on vital corridors, and enhancing competition in strategic sectors have become essential requirements for economic stability, not merely options for improving efficiency.

The 2026 crisis has proven that the world does not suffer from a shortage of trade, but from a structural imbalance. If globalization succeeded in maximizing efficiency in past decades, its success in the next decade will be measured by its ability to combine efficiency with resilience, not by sacrificing one for the other.

Economist specializing in economic policies, business strategy management, and strategic partnerships.