Abdul Latif Al Sheikh

After the Sahwa... Who Defines the Arab Liberal Now?

12 July 2026 - 00:02 | Last update 12 July 2026 - 00:02

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Introduction: The Paradox of a Bitter Victory:

For decades, the Arab liberal current fought its major battles under one main banner: confronting the Sahwa movement and the expansion of political Islam, from the Muslim Brotherhood to the Sururis and others. The prevailing assumption was that the decline of this opponent and the disintegration of its organizational and rhetorical structure would automatically pave the way for the 'Golden Age' of Arab liberalism. However, the current reality shocked everyone with a sharp paradox: the current crisis was not born from the rise of enemies, but from their absence. Instead of emerging from this battle stronger and more cohesive, the liberal current dissipated into a space of fragmentation, appearing as if it had lost its compass and active presence at the moment the opposition front vanished, leading us to the fundamental question posed by today's scene: Who defines the Arab liberal now?

Axis One: Historical Rooting... Presence as a Reaction:

Contemporary Arab liberalism, in most of its manifestations, did not form as a philosophical movement stemming from an independent intellectual accumulation, but rather was born and nourished as a 'defensive bloc' or a direct reaction to the ideological hegemony of the political Islamist current. The liberal discourse derived its legitimacy and vitality from contradiction with the other, acquiring its features through negating the Sahwa's theses, responding to its literature, and deconstructing its fatwas. This conditional link made the liberal existence a 'reactive' one primarily, moving with the opponent's movement and settling with its stillness, rather than being a project with its own self-constructed agenda and the ability to direct public opinion with its own tools.

Axis Two: Question and Answer... Deconstructing the Dimensions of the Predicament:

Q: Was Arab liberalism an integrated intellectual project, or primarily an opposition discourse?

Intellectually: A wide range of cultural critics believe that this current remained closer to 'journalistic liberalism,' mere opinions and impressions published in newspapers and websites, lacking depth in major philosophical and political references such as citizenship rights and the institutionalization of individual thought. On the other hand, it can be argued that the absence of supportive institutions does not negate the content entirely, as there are serious writings and sacrifices that discussed the rule of law and women's rights. However, its real predicament was that these efforts remained scattered and individual, unable to transform into an organized current that matches the organizational tools of the Sahwa.

Q: How did the absence of the traditional opponent reflect on the media performance of liberals?

Media-wise: The liberal presence was formed through a culture of 'engagement' and heated debates. When the voice of the Sahwa side faded, many figures counted as liberals found themselves with no clear issues and no 'subject' to work on. It became apparent that their popular support was built on the public's hatred of Sahwa extremism, not on belief in their propositions. On the other hand, some argue that this is the nature of modern media platforms that feed on binary polarization, and thus the flaw lies in the nature of the media medium, not solely in the essence of the intellectual content.

Q: What is the nature of the social alliance that rallied around liberal slogans?

Socially: A large segment of the public that supported the liberal discourse during the dominance of Sahwa was not convinced of liberal philosophy as a comprehensive vision of life. Rather, it was a temporary alliance to get rid of imposed social restrictions and a yearning for openness. On the other hand, this transformation is viewed positively as the realization of those demands on the ground represents a practical success for liberal ideas, even if the term is absent; the goal is quality of life and social freedom, not entrenchment behind labels.

Axis Three: The State as an Alternative Actor Leading Change:

The great paradox appeared in the Arab scene, and 'specifically Saudi Arabia,' when the 'state' directly undertook, through central sovereign decisions, the implementation of a wide package of social and rights reforms, such as women's empowerment, cultural openness, and reducing the influence of extremism. These demands were achieved without the need for intellectual mediation by the liberal elite, and without waiting for the accumulation of their cultural project. This transformation placed the traditional liberal in a 'lost function' predicament, as the official institution adopted the roles of positive modernization, making the intellectual elite appear as spectators or followers, rather than being active and having the greatest influence in directing public opinion.

Nevertheless, others may see that these reforms would not have succeeded with the same effectiveness without the intellectual accumulation that preceded them, and that ideas often pave the way before turning into policies. However, the fundamental difference here is that the sovereign decision transferred the idea from the margins of the article to the realm of action, proving that social change is not completed by mere discourse, but requires a state that possesses the courage of decision, the ability to implement, and the 'legitimacy' to turn theoretical possibility into positive reality with the state's vision.

Axis Four: The Predicament of the Term... and the Relationship with the New Generation:

The term 'liberalism' in the Arab space suffers from an old structural fragility. It has been associated in minds as an imported product rather than a concept rooted in the local environment, which its opponents exploited to link it to value detachment. Today, it seems that the new generation of youth practices some liberal patterns consistent with the state's vision as a lived reality in their daily details and personal choices, but they refuse to adopt the term as an 'ideological identity' or to join under the banner of an elite they see as belonging to the era of old intellectual conflicts. Rather, they have adopted it as a conscious national identity.

Here specifically, the crisis becomes clear in its deepest form: it is a 'crisis of form, not a crisis of essence.' What is truly in predicament is the name, the elite, and the conflict memory associated with the term. As for the logical and consistent content that liberal discourse defended, it has transformed into normal social practice, without an ideological banner, and without the need for a discourse to define it on behalf of its practitioners. The term has become a historical label burdened with individual battles, stripped of its constructive philosophical significance.

The Requirement of the Current Moment:

Criticizing the Arab liberal condition today is not a form of gloating, but a methodological necessity to dissect reality. The historical excuse that this current has used for decades—the presence of the dominant opponent—has disappeared. Arab liberals now face an inevitable and fateful requirement: either to move from the bank of 'reaction and media interaction' to the bank of 'action and independent systematic thought.' This is not an acknowledgment of a shrinking role, but a redefinition of it. Because societies do not always need someone to direct public opinion in the same way, as much as they need someone to root their achievements and transform them from successful decisions into a stable culture—not as a substitute for the state, nor as a competitor to its decision, but as an intellectual effort that consolidates gains, protects them intellectually, and grants them the ability to continue after the passage of times, people, and public mood.