The distinction between sentence and utterance is a central focus in modern linguistics, especially in pragmatic approaches and enunciative linguistics, particularly in the scientific projects undertaken by Benveniste and Ducrot in the mid-20th century and its last quarter. It is no longer sufficient to view language as a self-contained formal system; rather, invoking the conditions of use that move structure from potential to actualization has become necessary for achieving linguistic meaning.

In this context, the concept of 'utterance' emerges as a linguistic unit that goes beyond the boundaries of the sentence, deriving its identity from its connection to context and the speaker's act (speech act).

The utterance is understood as a specific realization of a sentence in a particular usage context. The sentence, as a theoretical entity, remains repeatable in infinite forms, while each realization constitutes an independent utterance linked to a specific time, place, and pragmatic intention.

Hence, the relationship between sentence and utterance is not one of identity, but of transformation from structure to event; the sentence moves from the level of linguistic potential to the level of actual achievement.

Thus, from a pragmatic perspective, the utterance is defined by a set of conditions, most notably: internal cohesion, so that the utterance has a semantic structure allowing it to be understood as an integrated unit; and relative autonomy, meaning the utterance is intended for itself, not merely a subordinate part of other speech.

Consequently, any linguistic segment that does not meet these two conditions cannot be considered a complete utterance, even if it appears as part of a broader discourse. This explains why some incomplete or subordinate structures are excluded from the count of utterances unless they acquire pragmatic independence.

This distinction between sentence and utterance entails a methodological distinction between signification and meaning. Signification is a property of the sentence, belonging to the linguistic system and derived from the regularity of units according to syntactic rules. Meaning, on the other hand, is a property of the utterance, realized in use as it is linked to context and the speaker's intentions.

Thus, language cannot be fully understood except by combining the two levels: structure, produced by rules, and use, which gives it pragmatic value.

The utterance transcends being a semantic structure to become a linguistic act; it is linked to the speech event itself. When we say that the utterance is an event, we reintroduce the speaker to the center of language; thus, every utterance is merely a trace of the speaker's activity at a particular moment, which cannot be separated from that activity.

Hence, there is an overlap between the concept of utterance and the concept of enunciation; the former is seen as the result of the latter, while enunciation represents the process that produces it.

The specificity of the utterance is evident in its inclusion of what are known as pragmatic shifters, such as pronouns (I, you), time markers (now, yesterday), and place markers (here, there). These elements do not carry fixed meaning in themselves but derive their meaning from the speech situation.

Therefore, reference in the utterance is not a ready-made given but is constructed within the linguistic act itself, making the utterance a dynamic unit that is formed each time according to its conditions of use.

Time in language is closely linked to the utterance, as it is understood not merely as a grammatical category but as a trace of the speech event. Linguistic tenses, in part, refer to the moment of speech, which is the center of temporal reference. Hence, linguistic time can only be perceived in light of the relationship between structure and act, i.e., between sentence and utterance.

Furthermore, the utterance is not limited to conveying meaning but also performs an illocutionary function on the addressee. Different modes of enunciation are understood not only as syntactic forms but also as performative acts that seek to produce some effect. This makes the utterance a truly pragmatic unit, as it transcends description to influence.

Despite the utterance's connection to context, its effect does not remain outside language but is reflected in its structure through certain special constructions, categories with a pragmatic character, and speech acts that refer to the linguistic activity itself. Thus, one can say that the utterance is an active element in shaping the linguistic system itself.

It is worth noting that the distinction between sentence and utterance has led to a reconsideration of the unit of linguistic analysis. The sentence, despite its importance, remains a theoretical unit insufficient to explain context-related phenomena. In contrast, the concept of utterance offers a more suitable approach because of its link to context, its inclusion of speaker and addressee, and its explanation of pragmatic phenomena that the sentence cannot contain.

In conclusion, it becomes clear that the concept of utterance has marked a qualitative shift in language study from focusing on structure to invoking use. It is a unit that combines form and meaning, system and event, and reveals the dynamic, communicative, active nature of language.

Therefore, any linguistic approach that neglects the utterance remains incapable of encompassing the reality of language in its practical aspect because it will inevitably ignore the dimension in which it is realized, i.e., it will ignore the dimension of use.