The Houthi Rabbit Hole
A questioner wrote: Why don't the Saudis settle the situation in Yemen and end the Houthi group? The truth is that after many years of following this file, I can.
A questioner wrote: Why don't the Saudis settle the situation in Yemen and end the Houthi group? The truth is that after many years of following this file, I can say that the Houthi issue resembles a 'rabbit hole'; every time you think you have reached its truth, you discover another layer of tunnels of relations and tribal and regional alliances.
The initial conclusion seems simple, but it is realistic: the Houthi is a temporary phenomenon. It is a small, armed, ideologically extremist tribal group, and all similar historical cases indicate that it does not last in the end. They are less than seven percent of Yemen's population, yet they succeeded in weaving broad local alliances, and alliances are both the group's weakness and its strength.
Nor is it correct to compare the Yemeni Houthi (Ansar Allah) to the Lebanese Hezbollah, which is larger in number and population percentage, and lives within its Shiite and social milieu inside Lebanon, not far from it like the Houthi in Sanaa. The Houthi is a minority that infiltrated from Saada to Sanaa exploiting the Arab Spring upheavals and occupied it by force of arms and alliances, and revived Imamate rule. The Houthi is not Hezbollah; it has no political future because it does not rely on population density.
There is also 'the Houthi thorn'. It not only threatens the stability of Saudi Arabia, but threatens Yemen first. The small Houthi has managed to make itself a player rivaling Iran in danger, as it took the lead in threatening international trade in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and navigation in general in the Red Sea, and the armed group also tried to play a cross-border and cross-water role into East Africa. But the Houthi remains a small faction that becomes more fragile the larger its size and the more it expands its aggressive activities.
In geopolitical comparisons, the Houthi with Saudi Arabia might resemble Cuba with the United States. Cuba appears as a small point in America's neighborhood. The communist island remained a thorn in Washington's side for decades due to its connection with Moscow. Now, Castro's Cuba is in its final chapter and will soon return to the American embrace.
As for how this ant lived and survived next to the American elephant? That was among the understandings of the Cold War. The United States decided to invade the Cuban island, an ally of Moscow. Although it tried once and failed, the Soviets became convinced that the Americans would not stop, so Khrushchev offered to remove the missiles in exchange for Kennedy's pledge not to invade the island, which would not become a source of threat, and for America to remove its missiles from Turkey, the American front line against Moscow. Both sides agreed, and Cuba continued as a pacified communist state, and Turkey as the Western ally that does not threaten Moscow.
The Houthi and Hezbollah are two proxies for Iran, which uses them within its strategy to impose its influence on the countries of the region, under well-known propaganda slogans. We do not yet know how Tehran will formulate its regional strategy as a result of the current war with the United States and Israel. If the proxy file is not resolved through negotiation, it is likely that these crisis-stricken areas may witness subsequent rounds.
In contrast, Yemenis are capable of harassing and exhausting the Houthi, and ultimately eliminating his project. Currently, he controls only a third of the territory he held at his peak. His airport is closed, his ports are under blockade, and his leadership is hiding underground. Moreover, from an Iranian perspective, the Houthi is a proxy of lesser strategic value than the Iraqi militias and Hezbollah, and will be the cheapest card on the table if it decides to bargain in regional deals. That is why I see it as a temporary phenomenon.
However, the challenge is that the Houthi has not been known for political flexibility, unlike Hezbollah, which has previously signed agreements with Israel and responded to calls from its Lebanese opponents in past crises.
And the question remains: Is there a way out for Ansar Allah from this hole they live in, which was a palace and then became a prison for them? The political solution still exists; it is political participation at the table that can save them from destruction. The Houthi remains a Yemeni component, which can be a partner in governance, not dominate it. Participation has been offered to them several times, but they remain stubborn and refuse, coveting all power until the day comes when they lose everything.
Original source: Asharq Al-Awsat
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