On July 13, 2024, Israeli warplanes bombarded an open area in the Mawasi Khan Younis region, southern Gaza Strip, with tons of explosives in about three minutes, targeting a small building there, immediately indicating the importance of the target.

This revelation comes as the Israeli war on Gaza continues, resulting in thousands of casualties and widespread destruction of infrastructure.

Hours later, Israel announced that the target was Muhammad Deif, the general commander of the Al-Qassam Brigades, while Hamas strongly denied this, stating that the targeted location was a shelter for displaced people.

Destruction at a site targeted by Israel in Mawasi near Khan Younis on July 13, 2024, as part of an operation to assassinate Al-Qassam commanders Muhammad Deif and Raafat Salama (AFP)

But about six months later, on January 30, 2025, Al-Qassam acknowledged the assassination of Deif, along with Khan Younis Brigade commander Raafat Salama and other leaders including Marwan Issa, Deif's deputy.

‘They thought he was in Gaza City’

Three Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the initial denial of Deif's assassination came because many movement leaders believed he was still in Gaza City, while some leaders knew he was in the south but without knowing his exact location.

It appears that some Hamas leaders who publicly denied were anticipating that he might be in one of the tunnels, while one source said, ‘Deif did not resort to tunnels since the start of the war, and perhaps was forced to do so once in one instance.’

The place where Deif was assassinated originally belonged to Raafat Salama, the Khan Younis Brigade commander who was killed alongside him, as well as many of Salama's sons and security men affiliated with Al-Qassam.

Photo published by Al-Qassam Brigades of Muhammad Deif with his obituary (Telegram)

However, Deif's final months before his assassination and how he moved around Gaza remained shrouded in mystery. On the second anniversary of his killing, Asharq Al-Awsat asked Hamas sources for information on how Israel identified him, reached him, and assassinated him.

Two Hamas sources confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that the Al-Qassam commander was actually in Gaza City at the start of the October 7, 2023 attack, and remained in the northern city until days before Israel's full control of the Netzarim Corridor, especially the coastal Rashid Street, which remained open for more than two weeks longer than its eastern section (Salah al-Din Street) was occupied.

‘Movement without guards... and interrupted communication’

The two sources, who live in Gaza and reviewed information provided by Deif's associates, confirmed that he left Gaza City alone without his personal guards and headed to Rafah in the south at the beginning of November 2023.

Another informed Hamas source said that some Al-Qassam leaders, including Izz al-Din al-Haddad (who later led Al-Qassam before Israel assassinated him last May), ‘advised Deif before leaving Gaza City to stay there, assuring their ability to provide security protection for him despite the conditions and extensive security pursuit.’

The source added that Deif ‘preferred to continue field work and manage battles, and follow any political developments related to the negotiations file, which had not started then.’

From right: Al-Qassam Brigades leaders assassinated by Israel in separate attacks: Muhammad Odeh, Raafat Salama, Abu Ubaida, and Muhammad Deif (photo published by the Israeli army)

The same source reveals that ‘the interruption of communication in the usual manner led to losing contact with Deif for more than 4 days, after he did not find the intermediary who was supposed to wait for him to transfer him to a location; forcing him to head deep south towards Rafah.’

Over the approximately four days, ‘Deif could not find any thread leading him to a safe Al-Qassam site, and due to the absence of his recent photo from Israeli intelligence and his photo not being widespread among Palestinians, Deif was able to sleep in areas in the streets of Rafah city, and once in one of its mosques without anyone noticing him,’ according to the source.

In the final months of 2023, Rafah city was home to the displacement of more than 1.3 million Palestinian refugees, the largest overcrowding during the war.

Palestinians waiting to cross into Egypt at the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt on November 1, 2023 (EPA)

Another Hamas source continued the story of how communication with Deif was restored, saying: ‘One of the field activists in Al-Qassam suddenly recognized Deif and moved him to a safe place, then transferred him to Khan Younis, and from there he was taken via another intermediary to where Raafat Salama was, before they moved together to several places, eventually settling in the location where they were assassinated.’

An unknown image of the Al-Qassam commander

The source says that although ‘Deif over the past years had become more visible among Al-Qassam leaders and through his visits to military and other sites, Israeli intelligence could not obtain any information or form a real picture of him, and all they knew was that he was injured and had at least one amputated foot, or suffered a severe injury in one of his feet or his hand.’

The source explains that ‘for periods when Deif was seriously injured in two incidents, there were attempts to take him outside Gaza for treatment with a fake identity; however, those efforts did not succeed, and he insisted on staying in Gaza.’

But another source said: ‘It seems that at a certain point, Deif left for treatment for a short period, then returned to Gaza,’ something not confirmed by the other source or other sources.

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According to three Hamas sources, Israel could not learn Deif's health status or even obtain an accurate image of him until it found ‘video clips and photos from events of Al-Qassam leaders, in which the commander participated, and found them inside sites deep in the Strip after Israeli forces penetrated.’

The sources explained that these documents were transferred to Israeli intelligence, which analyzed them and recruited hundreds of informants to try to reach him and distributed his photo among them, in addition to analyzing them via artificial intelligence, and feeding intelligence tools such as drones with information including his voice in the last footage of him shortly before the war during the preparation for the October 7 attack, which ‘led to reaching him and assassinating him’ according to those sources’ assessments.

These details shed light on how Israel managed to reach one of the most prominent Hamas leaders after months of pursuit. They raise questions about the extent of Israeli security agencies' infiltration of the movement, which may have repercussions for the future of Al-Qassam's military leadership. Deif's solitary movement also indicates a change in concealment and communication methods among field commanders.