Summary: If the Rome round produces an implementation roadmap that includes specific areas, announced dates, a simultaneous deployment of the army, a verifiable Israeli withdrawal, and an arbitration and monitoring mechanism, then it will be closer to an implementation negotiation than an open-ended process.

A new round of direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon was held on Tuesday in the Italian capital Rome, specifically inside the U.S. Embassy, following five rounds held in the U.S. capital Washington.

The Italian Foreign Ministry had announced that the talks would be held at the ambassadorial level, with the participation of Lebanese Ambassador Nada Hamadeh Maawad and Israeli Ambassador Yehiel Leiter, unlike previous negotiations that included a security delegation and a political delegation from both countries.

Israeli media also reported that the ambassadors of Israel and Lebanon in Washington would co-chair the session. In contrast, Lebanese media pointed to directives given by President Joseph Aoun to the Lebanese delegation, insisting on demanding the immediate start of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the two experimental zones before any further discussion.

Lebanese questions about moving negotiations to Rome

The transfer of the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations to Rome sparked a wide wave of questions in political and media circles about the implications of this shift, and whether it reflects the parties approaching a real settlement, or the beginning of a new phase of open-ended negotiations that could prolong the crisis. Question marks were also raised about whether changing the venue conceals a modification in the nature and terms of mediation, or paves the way for new approaches that may impose additional political and security costs on Lebanon in exchange for any progress in the negotiation track.

Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri criticized the negotiation track with the Israeli occupation in press statements, considering that the ongoing contacts have not yet achieved tangible results for Lebanon. Berri warned against proposing "experimental zones" in the south, cautioning that they could turn into a trap leading to internal tensions that only serve the Israeli occupation. He said that the direct negotiations that resulted in the "framework formula" have not yet led to any real benefits for Lebanon and its rights.

The US Embassy in Rome (AFP)

Former head of the Progressive Socialist Party, Walid Joumblatt, noted that "in the negotiation process, the final framework for negotiation must be set, and we must not fall again into a joint US-Lebanese statement that collects contradictions."

Joumblatt added, "We also warn against a process of negotiation for the sake of negotiation, like the Oslo accords track; a part of the south, its heritage, history, and people may become a thing of the past, as is happening in Palestine."

These questions may be legitimate, especially given the long experience of the Palestine Liberation Organization with Israel during negotiations.

Thus, the question is not why the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations moved to Rome, but what this move means politically, and what has changed so that changing the venue becomes part of the negotiating message itself? Especially since moving the talks from Washington to a European capital is no longer just a logistical detail, but an indication that the track has entered a more complex phase, after a quick breakthrough proved elusive in previous rounds. History shows that moving negotiations between capitals often reflects one of two possibilities: either the parties are approaching a settlement that requires broader international guarantees, or they are entering a phase of political attrition where continuing negotiation becomes an end in itself, while chances of reaching a final agreement diminish.

Who benefits from prolonging this track?

For Israel, prolonging the negotiation time gives it additional room to entrench field and security facts on the ground, maintain its freedom of military action, and link any withdrawal to increasing security conditions, gradually shifting the burden to the Lebanese state to prove its ability to implement its commitments. It also allows it to expand the network of international guarantees for its demands, so that its security conditions become over time part of the mediators' own agenda.

For Lebanon, the danger lies not in negotiation itself, but in the successive rounds turning into a platform for making gradual concessions without clear sovereign compensation. Every additional concession amid continued occupation or the absence of a binding timetable for withdrawal could shift Lebanon's position from a state negotiating the restoration of its full sovereignty to a state negotiating the restoration of part of it. At that point, moving from one capital to another becomes an indicator of prolonging the crisis, not of approaching its resolution.

Are the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations entering the labyrinth of "negotiation for the sake of negotiation"?

The transfer of the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations to Rome does not, in itself, mean that Lebanon has inevitably entered the long track that swallowed the Palestinian negotiations for over three decades, from Madrid to Oslo. But the similarity becomes serious when the change of venue is not accompanied by a change in the content of the negotiation, a binding timetable, and measurable reciprocal steps.

The fundamental lesson from the Palestinian experience is not that the negotiations were held in Madrid, Oslo, Washington, Camp David, Taba, or Annapolis, but that the negotiating process gradually transformed from a means to end the occupation into an open-ended framework for managing the conflict, while the field facts continued to change in favor of the stronger party at the time, namely Israel.

Oslo achieved a historic breakthrough represented by mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, and the establishment of an interim Palestinian Authority (AFP)

How did the Palestinian track begin?

The public track began with the Madrid Conference in Spain in 1991, after the first Gulf War, under US-Soviet sponsorship. The conference was the first broad, direct meeting between Israel and Arab delegations in decades, and it opened bilateral and multilateral negotiations, but it did not produce a final agreement. Later, the more important negotiating track shifted to secret talks in Norway between representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel, which ended with the Oslo Accords in 1993.

The Oslo Accords achieved a historic breakthrough represented by mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, and the establishment of an interim Palestinian Authority. However, they did not resolve the core issues: Jerusalem as a capital, borders, settlements, refugees, sovereignty, security, and water. All these files were postponed to "final status" negotiations. The interim period was supposed to last only five years, starting with the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, then ending with a final agreement. But the interim period did not end; it practically turned into a political and security structure that extended for decades.

Where was the structural flaw in Oslo?

The problem at the time was not in the idea of negotiation itself, but in the architecture of the agreement, through postponing decisive issues. Instead of agreeing from the outset on the shape of the final solution, an agreement was reached on interim arrangements, with the most dangerous issues to be discussed later.

Thus, each party had a different interpretation of the interim period: the Palestinians considered it a path to statehood, while the agreement did not include an explicit text guaranteeing the establishment of an independent Palestinian state at the end of the five years.

Lack of a real international enforcement and monitoring mechanism