Is it possible to build healthy, normal relations between the Arab Gulf states and some other Arab countries, such as Jordan and Yemen, on the one hand, and Iran under the ideological rule of the 'Revolutionary Guard' on the other?

This question is not new; it is not born of the day of the clash between Iran and America. Rather, it is an old question dating back to the birth of the Khomeini regime with its doctrines of Wilayat al-Faqih and the export of the revolution, and 'support for the oppressed'—the Iranian euphemism for Iranian interference in the affairs of other countries and the violation of their sovereignty.

The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia as the major power, have tried to build bridges of friendship with the Iranian regime and overlook the causes of tension, as happened in the bombing of the Khobar Towers in eastern Saudi Arabia in 1996. We recall the moments of distinct rapprochement during the rule of the late Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani with King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, when he was still Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. But these 'exceptional' moments did not succeed in permanently steering relations toward calm, peace, and normal relations with the Iranian regime. This is a 47-year experience, and this is its harvest today: an ideological regime that has grown more ferocious, arrogant, and armed.

The renowned thinker Professor Radwan al-Sayed is one of the most important Arab scholars who have deeply understood the roots of Islamic thought in the Middle East, including Iranian thought, for several decades. Two weeks ago, he wrote an article here titled 'Iran, the Arabs, and Relations in the Coming Time,' in which he said: 'It took me a while, but as I followed the Iranian way of thinking, I came to realize that the Iranian plateau, with its single state, and in the name of nationalism, sectarianism, or both, harbors imperial ambitions.'

Recalling and assessing the current situation, he said: 'We kept comforting ourselves that the cost of the militias and the nuclear program was very high, and it did not seem popular with the Iranian public. The more optimistic among us kept speculating that all of this was for blackmailing America and the Arabs, and that it would end after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, or after the nuclear deal with the Obama administration in 2015.'

This means that the military power of the Gulf states must be as formidable as Iran's, if not more so. Yes, I know that Iran lags in air power, and even in the efficiency and modernity of its ground and naval weapons... but it has compensated for that with very advanced investment in ballistic missile and drone programs, as well as in explosive-laden boats or fast and numerous speedboats, in addition to forming loyal militias, as in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.

Therefore, the Gulf states must rise to the challenge of Iran, which does not seem to be receding in the foreseeable future. One condition for achieving this is to work on cooperation and unity in these higher affairs, at the very least. If a Gulf political-diplomatic breakthrough occurs with the Iranian regime to build a healthy, normal relationship, then it would be light upon light, and that is exactly what is desired.

As Professor Radwan asked: 'Could there not be a meeting on a proposal to Iran in which both sides win? For what does Iran gain from spreading turmoil around it, unless it is a matter of ideology, in which case it is a disaster?!'