SummaryAfter decades of Syrian and Iranian guardianship, a new opportunity emerges to rebuild the state by confining weapons to the army, implementing the 'Framework Agreement,' consolidating the security partnership with the United States, and adopting a policy of neutrality and reforms. In contrast, Iranian influence remains the main obstacle to this path. Here, the decision of President Amin Gemayel to cut diplomatic relations with Iran is recalled as a precedent aimed at protecting Lebanon's sovereignty.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun arrived in Washington on a visit that goes far beyond the protocol meeting with US President Donald Trump. The issue is not about a photo at the White House, nor a diplomatic statement on support for Lebanon and its stability, but rather a political moment that may determine the country's position for decades to come: will Lebanon remain an open arena for the conflicts of others, or will it finally become a normal, neutral, stable state that monopolizes its decision, its weapons, and its borders?

After more than four decades, Lebanon returns to a crossroads very similar to the one it stood at in the early 1980s. Names and banners differ, but the essence of the crisis is almost the same. At that time, the Palestine Liberation Organization, supported by its allies in the Lebanese National Movement, turned Lebanon into an advanced military and political base in the conflict with Israel. The state lost its sovereignty, its institutions regressed, and security and military decisions became distributed among armed organizations and regional powers that treated Lebanese land as a platform, not a homeland.

Today, Hezbollah plays almost the same role, although the reference and circumstances differ. Just as the Palestinian armed decision bypassed the Lebanese state, the decision of war and peace in recent decades has been largely subject to Iran's calculations and its regional project. And just as Lebanon was previously pushed into a confrontation not decided by its people or institutions under the slogan 'Liberation of Palestine,' it was later pushed into wars and conflicts under the slogan 'Resistance,' while the state paid the price politically, economically, and humanly.

Lebanon stands at a historic crossroads similar to the era of Presidents Bachir and Amin Gemayel in the early 1980s (Reuters)

The Syrian Coup

In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with the aim of expelling the Palestine Liberation Organization and removing its forces from its borders. Israeli forces reached Beirut, and it ended with Yasser Arafat and his fighters departing by sea to Tunisia. Amid that shift, Bachir Gemayel emerged as a president carrying a different project for Lebanon: a centralized state, a unified army, an end to the era of militias, and rebuilding international relations on the basis of Lebanese interest, not axis calculations.

But the assassination of Bachir Gemayel did not bring down the man alone; it struck the state project at its most sensitive moment. With his brother Amin Gemayel assuming the presidency, negotiations continued leading to the May 17, 1983 agreement, which was supposed to regulate the Israeli withdrawal, re-establish the authority of the Lebanese state, and open the way for security arrangements that prevent Lebanon from being used as a launching pad for attacks on Israel.

The Lebanese-Israeli agreement at that time represented an attempt to take Lebanon out of war and return it to the international order. But Hafez al-Assad saw in any actual Lebanese independence a direct threat to his influence. So he used his allies inside, and supported the overthrow of the agreement by military force, leading to the February 6, 1984 uprising that toppled what remained of the state's balance and opened the door to consolidating the former Syrian regime's occupation of Lebanon.

The Iranian Coup

From that moment, Lebanon entered a long period of guardianship. Its institutions no longer made their own decisions, and its presidency and governments were unable to move outside the lines drawn by Damascus. The civil war formally ended, but the state did not regain its true independence. Armed chaos was replaced by a system of organized influence, which remained until the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 and the withdrawal of the Syrian army under pressure from the Lebanese uprising and the international community.

That year, the Lebanese believed the second chance had come. Squares filled with those demanding sovereignty and independence, and the belief prevailed that Lebanon could finally return to being a normal state after three decades of wars and occupations. However, the Iranian project was already ready to fill the Syrian void.

On May 7, 2008, Hezbollah used its weapons internally and overthrew the decisions of the Lebanese government, storming Beirut and other areas, imposing a new political equation under the threat of force. It was not just a security clash; it was a coup against the meaning of the state itself. Since that date, Lebanon effectively moved from the phase of Syrian guardianship to the phase of Iranian hegemony, as Hezbollah became the force that holds a veto over major decisions and imposes on the state the limits of its internal and external movement.

Three Files

Today, Joseph Aoun appears to be facing the most important attempt since 2005, and perhaps the most serious since the early 1980s, to get Lebanon out of this path. Hence, his visit to Washington gains exceptional strategic importance.

The meeting with President Trump will not be dedicated to discussing temporary aid or limited financial support. It is a meeting about the shape of the new Lebanon, its position on the regional map, the limits of its relationship with Israel, the future of Hezbollah's weapons, and the nature of the security partnership with the United States.

The first file will be the implementation of the 'Framework Agreement,' which is supposed to lead to a gradual and programmed Israeli withdrawal, met by a full deployment of the Lebanese army and the consolidation of its control over the south and the borders. This equation is not just a military arrangement; it is a direct test of the Lebanese state's ability to regain both land and decision.

The Israeli withdrawal, if it occurs without dismantling the parallel military structure of Hezbollah, will not produce stability. The same scene will repeat itself after a short period, because the problem is not just the presence of the Israeli army, but the continuation of an armed Lebanese party that holds the decision to open the front and link Lebanon to Iranian calculations.

As for the second file, it concerns consolidating a long-term American security partnership with Lebanon, based on supporting the Lebanese army and developing its capabilities, and establishing a clear coordination mechanism between Lebanon, the United States, and Israel to ensure implementation of the agreement and prevent violations. This could lead to a tripartite security formula in the south, overseeing withdrawal, deployment, and border monitoring.

This formula, if it takes shape, will be different from previous international monitoring experiences that failed to prevent Hezbollah's rearmament or the building of its military structure. The new element here is the transition from a gray management of the crisis to a direct executive mechanism that defines responsibilities and links any Israeli withdrawal to actual control by the Lebanese army.

As for the third file, it is the broadest and most sensitive: the repositioning of Lebanon regionally and internationally. What is required is not only stopping the war, but taking Lebanon out of the concept of an 'arena.' That is, to adopt a clear policy of neutrality, so it will not be a launching pad for threatening Israel, Syria, or any other state, nor turn into a platform for settling scores between Iran and the United States or between competing axes.