A Plan to Save the National Team
يستعرض تحليل رياضي أسباب تعثر المنتخب السعودي في البطولات خلال العقود الأخيرة، مسلطاً الضوء على انعكاسات عقود الاحتراف المحلي ومقارنتها بتجارب دول أخرى.
The Saudi national team's exit from the group stage of the 2026 World Cup, and its failure to beat Cape Verde, is not surprising at all. Argentina struggled against them, Spain and Uruguay could not defeat them, and perhaps the problem lies with the team or elsewhere. But I doubt the solution is in someone's resignation or holding another accountable, because it does not explain the Saudi Green's absence from winning tournaments for 30 years. What has been said requires an honest and neutral answer, and I believe it is relatively available and I will discuss it below.
It is not possible to hold FA President Yasser Al-Mishal and his team responsible for previous failures during his tenure, because the decline began with the advent of professional contracts in 1993, and the local football community turned into a haven to hide the flaws of Saudi players. The quality of foreign stars in clubs contributed to covering up the technical and physical deficiencies of Saudi players. The evidence is that the absence of these stars in the national team removed the fig leaf from local players, as evidenced by most of their modest international performances. Even their former coach Roberto Mancini said they do not know how to play football, as attested by player Ali Al-Bulaihi in an interview broadcast on April 8, 2025, and published by the Saudi newspaper Al-Riyadhiya. Current conditions have proven that Mancini's diagnosis was accurate and correct. Anyone who has followed the national team's recent matches will certainly notice their lack of the most basic basics of receiving and passing under pressure.
Scientific evidence of this was covered by a British study published in 2020 in the Journal of Sports Sciences, which recorded a clear technical delay and slow instantaneous muscle recovery among players trained in static schools, like the national team players, compared to their counterparts in high-intensity dynamic schools. This appears in muscle fatigue and random decisions by local players against the high speeds and physical drive of stars from European and Latin American teams. A French study published in 2022 in the International Journal of Sport Management confirmed that excessive interaction on social media platforms, especially with players in local leagues who are paid huge sums, gives them a delusional sense of success and reduces their motivation to exert more effort on the field by 30%. In contrast, players from export systems like Morocco and Senegal, who train and live in difficult environments and are forced to develop their skills daily to get a chance at professional play abroad, raise their football level and market value.
The outcomes of professionalization these days, when compared to the golden amateur era of the 1980s and 1990s, during which the Kingdom won two Asian Cup titles in 1984 and 1988—the first with a Saudi coach named Khalil Al-Zayani—plus the U-17 World Cup in 1989, and ended the Gulf Cup drought in 1994 under another Saudi, Mohammed Al-Kharashi, with an estimated budget for all national teams not exceeding $1.8 million, or about 6.7 million riyals. That budget was spent annually and was documented in reports of the General Presidency for Youth Welfare from 1984 until its name was changed to the General Authority for Sports and then upgraded to a ministry. This budget today is equivalent to only two-tenths of a percent when compared to the Football Federation's budget for 2026, which is $693,066,000 or 2.599 billion riyals, based on what was published by Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper on May 4 of this year. Strikingly, the current billions have not been reflected in the national team's performance.
Excessive spending does not stop at club budgets; it extends to spoiling the Saudi player with million-dollar salaries and endorsements before he achieves any real accomplishment with his national team, to the point that it has become a local anesthetic affecting his desire for competition and achievement. Meanwhile, a smart investment like the Mohammed VI Academy in Morocco, founded in 2010 with a budget not exceeding $16.8 million, has produced stars marketed for huge sums, including Achraf Hakimi, whose market value reached $85.6 million, while the total market value of all players in the Saudi first national football team is about $38.325 million. This means that his market value alone exceeds the entire team by 223%. The reason is his technical and physical foundation and early professional play in European stadiums.
The important thing now is to save the situation before the 2027 Asian Cup and the 2034 World Cup, by returning to the option of a national coach, reappointing Captain Saad Al-Shehri and tasking him with coaching the first team, given his achievements and experience with the U-17 and U-20 teams over nine years. Notably, seven of the coaches of the top ten teams in the FIFA rankings, or 70%, are national coaches, according to June 2026 figures. World Cup-winning teams between 2006 and 2026 were led by coaches from their own countries. It is also necessary to completely replace the current national team players without hesitation, as a temporary stage, except for Musab Al-Juwayr because he is the best in the midfield position at age 23, with a 78% international pass completion rate, the highest numerically among local players according to the Saudi national team history and statistics website. Prepare a team with an average age of 21 as a first aid measure, then move to permanent solutions by launching a mandatory external scholarship program for promising players aged 16 to 20, for professional play and actual participation in mid-tier European clubs with full government funding, to enable them to learn the basics of playing at a fast and strong pace. Also set a cap on contracts and salaries for players under 23 in the local league, with a maximum of one million riyals or $375,000, to force them out of their comfort zone and accept external professional play to develop their physical and technical level. Additionally, privatize youth sector segments, separate them financially and administratively from the first team of the club, and assign their operation to global companies and academies like Ajax and Benfica, to ensure building a generation that restores the national team's former glory at the very least.
Translated from Al-Riyadh
Advertorial
Advertorial
Disclaimer: All published articles represent the views of their authors only.
Original source: Al Arabiya
Comments (0)
Be the first to comment.