The internal popular isolation suffered by Iran's political system, coupled with internal divisions among the ruling elite of Khomeini's followers—the system's founder—are causing instability in political decision-making and leading to contradictions in adopted policies and media statements, which will negatively impact the future of the political system and the stability of Iranian society.

When the regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi reached its end in 1979 due to misguided policies that led to escalating negatives in many areas—especially economic, developmental, social, religious, cultural, commercial, and business sectors—most segments of Iranian society were intensifying their demands for rapid reform to mitigate the growing hardships affecting people's living standards. When the Shah's regime failed to address these mounting grievances, Khomeini, the prominent cleric who had opposed the Shah for more than twenty years, succeeded in leading a popular revolution. This revolution, joined by most segments of Iranian society, caused the fall of the Shah's regime and contributed to the establishment of a new political system under Khomeini's leadership in February 1979.

Yes, Khomeini led the Iranian people's revolution, which comprised various political and party factions, intellectual and religious orientations, economic and commercial aspirations, social and popular classes, security and military affiliations, and other groups. This facilitated the swift establishment of a new political system that faced no real opposition from supporters of the toppled Shah's regime. It was a popular revolution through which the people of Iran aspired to:

1) Establish a political system representing different factions, orientations, aspirations, classes, and affiliations.

2) Establish a political system that allows fair political participation for all.

3) Establish a political system that works for comprehensive economic development.

4) Establish a political system that fights all forms of political, administrative, financial, and social corruption that caused the people to revolt against the Shah's regime.

However, contrary to that, the Iranian people discovered that all their aspirations from the revolution they participated in would not be realized, and all their hopes and dreams about the future of their state and its political status would remain unfulfilled—due to the security, military, and non-constructive orientations and policies on which the new political system under Khomeini was founded.

Yes, after taking control of the new political system, Khomeini monopolized power, excluded all those who disagreed with him—whether from political, intellectual, economic, social, security, or military backgrounds, or others who differed with him ideologically and politically—and monopolized authority, granting it only to those with intellectual orientations aligned with his political, intellectual, and religious views. Based on this approach, a single current—represented by those believing in Khomeini's ideas and orientations—dominated Iran's political system, excluding everyone who did not share their views. This was the first outcome of forming a politically and intellectually monolithic political system, which year after year caused the political system's popularity to decline until it reached a state of political isolation from the Iranian people due to its misguided policies that led to internal divisions, isolation, and international sanctions.

If the first outcome of the monolithic practices of Khomeini's system caused the isolation of Iran's political system at the popular level internally and at the regional and international levels, then the internal conflicts within the monolithic current dominating Iran's political system—represented by followers of Khomeini's thought and orientation—are causing contradictions in policies, orientations, actions, and statements for several reasons, including:

1) The existence of a new political elite born after the 1979 revolution, with ideas and orientations different from the older revolutionary generation that still controls power.

2) The existence of a new political elite born after the 1979 revolution, which believes in Khomeini's ideas and orientations and hopes to continue leading the state and succeed those in power.

3) A political conflict between a political elite that sees the importance of changing domestic political orientations, getting closer to the Iranian people, and meeting their demands in order to maintain the system's stability, and another political elite that sees no importance in making any changes to domestic policy.

4) A political conflict between a political elite that sees the necessity of changing foreign policy orientations and dealing rationally with regional and international challenges to preserve the survival of the political system, and another political elite that sees the necessity of continuing with the political and security orientations on which the system was founded, confronting regional and international challenges regardless of their magnitude.

5) A political conflict between a political elite that believes in the importance of integrating into the regional and international community and abiding by international law to benefit from political, economic, investment, and trade opportunities that would enhance Iran's standing domestically and internationally, and another political elite that believes in continuing the approach on which the system was founded—direct and indirect confrontation with regional and international states and disregard for international law.

6) A political conflict between a political elite that believes in diplomacy, dialogue, and negotiations to resolve political and security disputes with states instead of conflict and war, and another political elite that believes in interfering in the internal affairs of states by any means necessary and considers that the best way to achieve Iran's domestic, regional, and international policies and orientations.

In conclusion, it is important to note that after 47 years since its establishment, Iran's political system suffers from the following:

1) Internal popular isolation due to the monopolization of power by Khomeini's followers and the exclusion of all popular components.

2) An escalating state of conflict among those in power—followers of Khomeini—due to differing visions on the correct way to address domestic issues and face external challenges.

Yes, the internal popular isolation suffered by Iran's political system, and the internal division among the ruling elite of Khomeini's followers—the system's founder—are causing instability in political decision-making and leading to contradictions in adopted policies and media statements, which will negatively impact the future of the political system and the stability of Iranian society.