Summary: The transition of the United States from the stage of political confrontation and economic blockade to the stage of direct war and the use of military force constituted a shock to the Iranian leadership, whose distant goal was not continued confrontation with Washington and turning it into a military one, but rather reaching the goal of recognition of its role and position in regional equations, without having to enter the system of American interests or what is known as the American axis.

Since the announcement of the ceasefire between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other, and the revelation of the memorandum of understanding signed in the Pakistani capital Islamabad, Iranian factions began a policy of promoting a narrative based on trying to exploit the failure of the American administration to achieve its goal of overthrowing the regime or forcing it to accept its conditions into a political victory and resilience, and strengthening its military capabilities and regional influence.

The transition of the United States from the stage of political confrontation and economic blockade to the stage of direct war and the use of military force constituted a shock to the Iranian leadership, whose distant goal was not continued confrontation with Washington and turning it into a military one, but rather reaching the goal of recognition of its role and position in regional equations, without having to enter the system of American interests or what is known as the American axis.

The political expressions that contributed to shaping the shock for the Iranian leadership—that is, this leadership, from founder Ruhollah Khomeini and after him Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—came in ruling out any large-scale American war against Iran and its regime, and they expressed that by affirming that "America cannot commit any folly," either as a result of the doctrinal and ideological dimension on which the founder built, or considering what Iran had achieved in possessing military capabilities, regional influence, and strategic depth in West Asia, as Supreme Leader Khamenei believed.

Perhaps the account given by former Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani before his assassination and after the assassination of the Supreme Leader, in an interview he conducted with the official Iranian Radio and Television organization about some details of a meeting he had with former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—which took place at the latter's request during one of his visits to America in 2015—represents a clear expression of the Iranian mentality in its view of the importance of its position on the international map, the difficulty of the military option for the Americans, and Washington's desire to restore its relations with Iran considering the geopolitical and geoeconomic weight it represents, and that the importance of this weight was the motive for keeping the Iranian plateau as a unified geographical entity when the great powers agreed to divide the region after the First and Second World Wars.

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Despite the big slogans raised by the Iranian regime, from "Death to America" to the pursuit of the "supreme" doctrinal and ideological ambition of eliminating the Israeli entity and erasing it from existence, the goal was not and will not be to inflict defeat and end American hegemony or eliminate Israel, but rather to seek a major settlement under which Washington officially recognizes the Iranian role and position, in return for Tehran normalizing its relations with Washington without subordination or submission to America's political will. The two milestones of the 2015 agreement on the nuclear program with the administration of former President Barack Obama, and the memorandum of understanding signed by US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on June 17 last year, were among the most prominent indicators of this Iranian desire.

The Iranian ambition to reach this equation with successive US administrations over three decades was based on and built upon a discourse that antagonizes Washington on one hand, relies on a nuclear program that brings Iran close to the nuclear threshold, in addition to a broad base of regional influence through the proxies it planted in West Asia on the other hand—especially since these proxies formed an ideological and strategic depth for Iran and its regional project, aimed at pushing Washington to accept Iran as a regional power, a power not operating under the American security umbrella.

The Iranians were aware of the sensitivity of this equation, especially on the Israeli side, and that the main battle and primary conflict would not be with Washington, but rather between their ambitions and those of Tel Aviv over who would extend hegemony and control over the Middle East region and be the decision-maker there. This was expressed by a number of Iranian leaders such as Ali Larijani and Ali Shamkhani, both killed by Israel in the recent war, who spoke about the need for Washington to abandon its absolute support for Tel Aviv and move toward a kind of balance in dealing with regional powers with influence and role, and recognition of their position on the map of regional equations.

If these leaders were shocked by Washington's rapid transition from a policy of containment, blockade, and political and economic isolation to a policy of direct military and security confrontation, this reveals the magnitude of the Iranian error in reading the complexities of the relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv. Despite Washington's affirmation of the functional role of Tel Aviv in the equation of American interests—as confirmed by US Vice President JD Vance and also President Trump's special envoy to Syria and Iraq, Tom Barrack, that American interests are prioritized if they conflict with Israeli interests or any other ally—thus, its handling of the course adopted by President Trump in achieving American interests on the global level did not take into account the possibility of transitioning to the military level and direct confrontation, and that what was possible with any previous US president would not be viable with Trump, who is enamored with breaking free from all constraints and rules in international relations.

President Trump's decision to return to war, overturn the negotiating table, end the ceasefire, and suspend the memorandum of understanding produced by the negotiation track sponsored by Pakistan, brings to the fore the possibility that Trump has opened a new path that revives the basic ambition that aligns with Tel Aviv's ambitions: dismantling the Iranian regime and eliminating it through military pressure, economic exhaustion, and the possibility of internal conflicts.

With this return and the attempt to re-impose Trump's terms on Tehran—which involve ending all its ambitions in a manner akin to surrender—Trump has fired a shot at the equation Tehran wants to reach: recognition of its role without being part of the American axis, in an attempt to emulate the experience of the opening led by Kissinger toward China in 1972. However, what was missing from Iranian calculations is that that opening was forced by the Cold War and Washington's efforts to weaken its adversary, the Soviet Union, and prevent any alliance between the two sides, whereas what Iran seeks to encircle is none other than Washington's regional arm in Tel Aviv, and that American interests have not yet reached a reading that allows it to abandon this arm in favor of a new equation in the Middle East in which Iran has a position, role, and partnership.