Path

Is Hormuz Redesigning American Power and the World Order?

The confrontation between Washington and Tehran is no longer just a bilateral crisis; it has become a conflict over the very definition of power. The outcome of the crisis may be measured by the equation of the United States' ability to destroy targets and Iran's ability to disrupt the international order that Washington guards. Since the outbreak of war on February 28, 2026, followed by the June memorandum and its truce, which President Trump declared ended (while keeping the door open for negotiations), it has become clear that American military superiority has not produced political submission, and that Iran's relative control over Hormuz has not turned into a strategic victory.

This explains the shift in the center of gravity (security/negotiation) from nuclear facilities to the strait. Hormuz is no longer a side issue; it has become Iran's mechanism to turn its traditional weakness into a global tax. Here, a few blind drones, missiles, boats, and mines are enough to raise insurance costs, disrupt supply chains, and bring inflation to the American interior. That is why Washington now demands an Iranian public acknowledgment of freedom of navigation—not because its fleet is incapable of striking, but because guarding every ship indefinitely means an Iranian victory in terms of cost. In return, Tehran cannot close the strait for long without strangling its exports and alienating China, India, and of course the Gulf states.

However, what further weakens the Iranian tactic is the suspicious ambiguity inside Tehran. The absence of the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, from the public sphere and the rising weight of the Revolutionary Guard make the crucial question one of unity of command and control. Are the attacks used as a central negotiating card, or have some power centers become able to sabotage a settlement to protect their influence? Moreover, the remaining stockpile of highly enriched uranium and the lack of field inspections by the IAEA will remain a gap that allows each side to interpret the other's intentions in the worst possible way.

As for China and Russia, the crisis has exposed the limits of their partnership with Iran. Both provided political cover and varying economic and informational benefits, but they did not become military guarantors. Moscow wants to keep attention diverted from Ukraine, continue draining American munitions, and increase energy prices. Beijing wants oil flow and trade stability without paying the cost of securing the maritime system it criticizes American hegemony over. On this basis, Washington's military and political tactics carry a message beyond Iran. Washington does not want to push Iran further toward Beijing and Moscow, while at the same time trying to show strength by demonstrating its ability to manage and protect the corridors. But continued escalation may raise the military and political costs that Washington needs to reduce in order to balance China.

Therefore, in the coming months, negotiations under fire are likely to continue. The situation may oscillate between a temporary maritime calm, limited punitive strikes, sanctions that are lifted and then reimposed, and mediations that advance whenever the two sides approach the brink of losing control. This path will give Washington deterrence without decisiveness, and give Tehran survival without surrender, but it will leave energy markets and Gulf states hostage to fickle decision-making.

After this path, an uncalculated escalation scenario may emerge: an attack on a tanker, a strike from an Iranian hardline faction, or an effective escalation against a Gulf state. Then the war would shift from punishing Iran to a confrontation in which Tehran does not lose much, and Washington only gains a prolongation of the conflict.

Accordingly, the only solution seems to be moving toward a comprehensive international settlement within a phased deal that includes verifiable guarantees for freedom of navigation in Hormuz, restoration of IAEA oversight, addressing the uranium stockpile, restrictions on naval and missile capabilities, and a gradual lifting of sanctions, with Gulf participation and international guarantees. In this scenario, Washington would emerge not fully victorious; Iran would survive but not be triumphant. The truth that Hormuz will carry to the international order is that those who could not prevent the closure of the strait may be incapable of managing the world that will form after its reopening.

He said and continued:

Power without wisdom is like a sword without a hilt.