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In modern political thought, the state is no longer defined as a religious mission or a cross-border revolutionary movement, but rather as a political and legal institution whose primary aim is to protect society, safeguard sovereignty, and achieve the interests of citizens. From this perspective, the strength of states is measured by the security, stability, and prosperity they provide to their peoples, not by the number of fronts they manage or the conflicts they engage in outside their borders. Hence the concept of the 'normal state' emerged, that is, a state that makes national interest the criterion for its domestic and foreign policy, and deals with the world according to the logic of politics rather than the logic of ideological doctrine. This concept does not refer to an ideal state, but rather to a state that behaves according to the rules established by the modern international system, where serving the citizen is the goal, and the instruments of power are at the service of the state, not the other way around.

This may be what prompted Henry Kissinger to say that Iran must decide its choice: Is it a state or a cause? Or as Zbigniew Brzezinski saw it, the problem lies not in Iran's power, but in the nature of the regime that governs it. The world deals with many countries that possess nuclear weapons without viewing them as a permanent source of concern, because their behavior is ultimately governed by considerations of national interest. However, when power is coupled with an ideological project that transcends state borders, traditional political calculations become more complex, and political behavior becomes less predictable. After the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran chose to link its political identity with a revolutionary project that transcends its national borders, and the principle of 'exporting the revolution' became part of its official discourse and regional policy. Foreign policy was no longer conducted solely according to the logic of the nation-state; rather, considerations of national interest became intertwined with ideological commitment, blurring the boundaries of the state with the boundaries of the project.

However, this model was not only criticized from abroad, but also sparked a wide debate inside Iran itself. Among the most prominent voices in this context is Iranian political science professor Sadegh Zibakalam, who called for redefining the function of the state, asking: What has the Iranian citizen gained from spending resources on conflicts beyond the borders, while the interior suffers from inflation, currency depreciation, unemployment, and economic crises?

Zibakalam was not calling for weakening Iran or abandoning its interests, but rather raising a question about the state's priorities. In his view, the strength of states is not measured by the number of regional files they manage, but by their ability to build a solid economy, advanced universities, efficient institutions, and a decent standard of living for their citizens. A state that burdens itself with the costs of a permanent ideological project may find, over time, that the cost of this project exceeds its capacity to bear. The importance of this debate lies in the fact that it reveals that the disagreement over Iran's role is not just a dispute between Iran and its neighbors, but also an internal discussion about the meaning and function of the state. Is the state established to serve its citizens, or to carry a project that transcends its borders? Does it derive its legitimacy from the welfare of its people, or from the extent of its influence?

The answer to this question will determine not only the future of Iran, but also, to a large extent, the future of security and stability in the Gulf and the Middle East.

Dr. Muhammad Al-Wuhaib

Quoted from 'Al-Qabas'

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