As the Lebanese army deploys in the first 'experimental zones' in the south, the implementation mechanism of the framework agreement enters its first test. While the state seeks to establish its security presence in coordination with UNIFIL and the Military Coordination Group, the success of the experiment remains contingent on Israel's commitment to full or gradual withdrawal, the army's ability to secure its deployment, and Hezbollah's stance on the upcoming phases.

Earlier on Tuesday, units of the Lebanese army began deploying in the town of Zawtar al-Gharbi in the Nabatieh district, in cooperation with the Military Coordination Group for Lebanon, as part of completing their deployment in southern areas. Meanwhile, the army command called on citizens not to head to the town until the security situation stabilizes.

The Lebanese army command later announced that Israeli forces opened fire near the military units while carrying out the mission inside Zawtar al-Gharbi, endangering soldiers and hindering the deployment process. It stressed that the army's deployment was limited to Zawtar al-Gharbi, and called on Israel to address any issues through official coordination channels with the (MCG4L) group, rather than resorting to attacks.

Retired Brigadier General in the Lebanese army, Akram Sariwi, explained to Al-Sharq the field deployment map of the Lebanese army units that entered Zawtar al-Gharbi, a town that Israeli forces did not directly occupy but were stationed on its outskirts. He noted that army units deployed and engineering teams began clearance operations for unexploded ordnance and securing the area, while the army command asked residents to wait until survey operations are completed and the area is verified safe.

As for the towns of Froun, al-Ghandouriya, Qalaouiyé, and Burj Qalaouiyé, the Lebanese army announced conducting field patrols, setting up checkpoints and observation and inspection posts. However, deployment there has not yet reached the stage of full ground takeover as in Zawtar al-Gharbi, because it is linked to the stages of Israeli withdrawal according to the plan.

In Zawtar al-Sharqiya, the town adjacent to Zawtar al-Gharbi, the Lebanese army has not yet deployed due to the continued presence of Israeli forces there.

Sariwi pointed out that 'the Lebanese army was originally present in the area south of the Litani River before the clashes reignited in early March, and it currently has more than 8,000 soldiers ready to deploy and impose state authority.'

He continued: 'The main challenge lies in the need for more equipment, vehicles, and engineering teams, because the area is classified as dangerous due to large quantities of mines and unexploded ordnance.' He suggested that deployment would be carried out in phases, starting with main roads then moving into villages to facilitate the return of residents, parallel to launching reconstruction and infrastructure restoration.

Who will oversee the verification process?

The retired brigadier general explained that there is still disagreement over which entity will handle the verification process and how to form coordination committees. This issue could be resolved after the arrival of the American general who will lead the process.

He said: 'The main problem is that Israel rejects any role for the UN Interim Force (UNIFIL), and also objects to French participation. This complicates the scene, especially since the current number of American personnel is insufficient to oversee a large-scale operation that requires a field presence accompanying the Israeli withdrawal and the Lebanese army deployment, to prevent a repeat of the incidents that occurred in Zawtar al-Gharbi.'

Regarding the future of international forces, Sariwi believes they are threatened with departure at the end of this year if their mandate is not renewed, amid American and Israeli rejection of their continued presence in their current form. He explained that Lebanon, in coordination with a number of friendly countries, insists on keeping international forces to help the army impose state authority in the south. He noted that the solution could be through bilateral agreements with countries willing to keep their forces, or through a French initiative within the Security Council to request an extension of UNIFIL's mandate.

Sariwi considered that 'the main problem lies in the ambiguity of the agreement. It did not set clear timeframes for the Israeli withdrawal, nor did it specify the number of experimental zones into which the occupied area will be divided, in addition to the lack of clarity on the verification mechanism and the entity authorized to declare its completion and the success of the Lebanese army in its mission. This matter affects Lebanese sovereignty, as it is unacceptable to subject the work of the Lebanese army on Lebanese soil to supervision by an external authority.'

The ambiguity of the agreement also opens the door for Israeli stalling, and could turn the withdrawal process into a long one extending for years. Moreover, the agreement effectively bypasses UN Resolution 1701, as well as the previous 2024 agreement that stipulated a 60-day deadline for the Israeli withdrawal.

He added: 'For the Lebanese army and Hezbollah, there is a clear decision that the army will assume responsibility for deployment in the area south of the Litani River, especially since the areas from which Israeli forces are supposed to withdraw do not see any Hezbollah presence. Meanwhile, the army shows full readiness to prevent the return of any armed groups. But the main question remains related to how the United States and Israel will deal with the next phase, particularly if a complete Israeli withdrawal is linked to the issue of disarming Hezbollah across Lebanese territory.'

Israel and the 'Yellow Zone'

The Secretary-General of the Lebanese Center for Strategic Studies, Abdullah Risha, considered that the implementation of the first phase of 'experimental zones' in southern Lebanon constitutes a crucial test for the security arrangements path between Lebanon and Israel. However, he stressed that the declared Israeli position still excludes any withdrawal from the 'Yellow Zone' (also known as the Yellow Line, a buffer border strip extending inside Lebanese territory to a depth of 4 to 10 kilometers, imposed by the Israeli army as a fait accompli during military operations), making it the main obstacle to any progress in negotiations.

Risha confirmed to Al-Sharq that the success of this track will give an additional boost to the anticipated Rome talks, while its failure will slow down the negotiation process. He pointed out that the Lebanese file remains closely linked to regional developments, particularly the relationship between the United States and Iran.

He considered that the Israeli commitment to withdraw from points in the 'first experimental zone' does not necessarily mean Tel Aviv's readiness to repeat the same mechanism in later stages. He noted that the statements of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after signing the framework agreement with Lebanon confirm that Israel does not intend to withdraw from the 'Yellow Zone' or the buffer zone, but rather considers it necessary to protect northern settlements.

Risha added that the current Israeli government views this area as a strategic and military achievement, and perhaps also ideological, making the chances of negotiation over it limited under the current coalition composition in Tel Aviv.

He explained that the maneuvering margin is limited to the 'experimental zones' located outside the Yellow Line, whether in parts north of the Litani or some areas south of it, according to Israeli security and military assessments.